THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO 9/11
Philip Towle*
It was politically and strategically unwise for the Bush administration to
use the term "war on terror" after 9/11. It should rather have considered itself,
and told the public, that the West was henceforward involved in a struggle
against Islamic radicals, such as al Qaeda. By calling the struggle a war, the
administration encouraged the pressure to increase the defense budget by fortyfive percent or by twenty-two percent when inflation is taken into account. Yet,
this is irrelevant or even counter-productive as far as the present struggle is
concerned.' Above all, the administration shifted attention away from the
essential battle for men's hearts and minds, and particularly for the support of
the Moslem world.
The United States administration built up the Islamists' cause when it
proclaimed a war on terror. Ironically, Bonnie Cordes of the Rand Corporation
had used exactly these words in 1987 to illustrate what Western governments
should not do when faced with terrorism, warning that "a war against
international terrorism" would be welcomed by terrorists because it confirmed
their fantasies that they were "at war" against the state, united the core terrorist
group, and strengthened their prestige in the community from which they
sprang.2 Just as the Carter administration made the fatal mistake of focusing on
the hostages held in Iran in the late 1970s and thereby built up the standing of
the Iranian government, so has the Bush administration staked everything on the
war on terror.3
What was novel about the tragedy on 9/11 was that terrorists were carrying
their struggle into the Western heartland. In retrospect, what is surprising is that
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past guerrilla wars were almost entirely confined to the Third World;4 the Viet
Minh did not attack metropolitan France directly and the Viet Cong did not
attack the United States. Now, that has changed partly because Palestinians set
the example at the Munich Olympics and beyond of conducting their struggle
against the Israelis in Europe, and partly because so many Moslems live in the
West and form a sea in which the Islamist fish can swim. This makes the
conflict very different from the historic insurgencies after the Second World
War, when the discomforted Western armed forces could withdraw from the
battlefield as the French did in 1954 and the Americans in 1973.
The insurgents have chosen the field of the current struggle; and the
United States efforts to shift this to the level where they have overwhelming
advantage-the conventional level-have been only ambiguously successful so
far in Afghanistan and an unmitigated calamity in Iraq. Yet, the increase in
defense expenditure since 9/11 encourages the tendency to take this type of
action. Given the overwhelming conventional superiority, which it already had
over any other state, the US can easily attack small states-as in the case of the
raid on Tripoli-or overthrow their governments as in Grenada in October 1983
and in Panama in December 1989. To undertake the much more ambitious
project of both removing a government and subsequently constructing another
may be possible when the will of the people has been broken in a prolonged and
bloody campaign, when the previous government has been totally discredited,
and when there is a large body of people waiting to take over the reins of power
who are sympathetic to the invaders. Most of these circumstances prevailed in
Germany, Italy, and Japan at the end of the Second World War. The allies sent
tens of thousands of troops into Japan and Germany expecting that resistance
might continue, but there was none whatsoever. Such conditions did not prevail
in Afghanistan and Iraq; and the consequence of Western intervention is to
expose weakness in the face of insurgency. The conventional wars had been
very short, the will of the Iraqi and Afghan people had not been broken, and in
the eyes of substantial minorities, previous regimes were not discredited.
Prospects for successful reconstruction were, therefore, grim.
Given terrorism's intrinsic link to mass politics, which have been
intensifying and spreading ever since 1789, destroying it, as the Bush administration has claimed to be doing, is no more realistic than the equally chiliastic
notion of abolishing conventional warfare has been for the League of Nations
and the UN. Unconventional warfare could only disappear if all great political
issues had been settled. But, if the ideological divisions of the twentieth
century have largely disappeared, other "causes" have appeared or reappeared
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on the political screen. In Britain, animal rights groups have threatened to kill
to achieve their ends, and in the United States anti-abortionists have done the
same. Above all, religion, which was written out of politics at the start of the
twentieth century, has become an ever greater cause of dissension and violence.
Until the collapse of Yugoslavia, Western publics were religion-blind, they
cannot be so today.
We can then dismiss the notion of a war on terror, while admitting that the
United States and its allies are involved in what promises to be a very long
struggle against al Qaeda and its affiliates involving spasmodic violence and
continuous propaganda, while each side tries to break or bend the will of the
other. We can also see that al Qaeda's center of gravity is the will of its leaders,
and much more importantly in the long run, the sympathy that their aims evoke
in a wide constituency within the Moslem world. The assumption must be that
even if all current al Qaeda members were converted, captured, or killed, their
places could be taken by others. Ominously, sixty percent of Jordanians and
fifty-one percent of Pakistanis expressed "a lot" or "some" confidence in
Osama bin Laden in Pew's July 2005 poll.5
Mass sympathy for terrorism and guerrilla warfare makes it far more
difficult to compel such enemies to "do our will," using Clausewitzean
terminology, because we are no longer just dealing with governments or armed
forces, which might be said to have some collective will that can be coerced,
but a plethora of individual wills. Historians have suggested that it was, for
example, Eric Ludendorff's will which broke after the failure of the German
offensive in the spring of 1918.6 Once his will had given way, the Kaiser's
government made terms with the allies; it was, similarly, the Japanese
Emperor's immediate entourage who decided that their country had to accept
allied terms after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.7
In contrast, even when terrorist or guerrilla leaders negotiate terms, as the IRA
or the Palestinian Liberation Organization may be said to have done in recent
years, splinter groups of more extreme factions may continue the struggle and
undermine the old leadership. This is most likely when the insurgents have the
backing, tacit, or explicit, of large sections of the surrounding population. Thus,
even when such a struggle ends or tails off for a period, after a compromise has
been reached between the government and the insurgents, it is quite likely to
break out again at a later stage, as indeed the IRA struggle has from time to time
against the British and opposition by Hamas to the Israelis. This demonstrates
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only too clearly that the battle for hearts and minds of the wider public is the
heart of the struggle. Unless the vast majority can be convinced that the
compromise is fair, no peace will last.
While the fragmentation of willpower is in many ways an advantage to the
guerrillas, it is a disadvantage to democracies. Democratic people usually rally
around their government when a war or covert struggle begins, though there
will always be hesitations, particularly amongst the older sections of the
population, who have experience of previous conflicts, and the less educated,
who prefer their government to concentrate its attention on home affairs.' But,
as the struggle continues, it becomes steadily more difficult to maintain any sort
of democratic consensus because economic and human costs increase and
propaganda battles confuse opinion.
While apocalyptic visions of a clash between multiple civilizations may
seem to many people to be far-fetched, it is incontrovertible that the relationship between the West and the Islamic world is steadily deteriorating and that
religion is becoming an ever more divisive issue.9 According to Pew, only
twenty-one per cent of Turks and twenty-two per cent of Pakistanis have a
favorable view of Christians, and no Lebanese or Jordanians were willing to
express sympathetic views of the Jews.'° Moreover, because of the asymmetry
between the conventional strength of the West and of the Islamic states, and
because this is a conflict between peoples--or by some Moslems against the
West, though not yet, vice versa-rather than countries, it manifests itself in
guerrilla warfare and terrorism waged by the Islamists. In these respects, the
new struggle contrasts with the Cold War, which was not a conflict between
peoples; there was no personal antagonism between the mass of Russians and
Americans, Britons and Poles. The confrontation in the northern hemisphere at
least was between two societies, each trying to prove that it was superior both
at producing weapons and at providing its people with the better standard of
living. The Soviet challenge disintegrated when its people gradually realized
how far their conditions had lagged behind the West. At the same time, Mikhail
Gorbachev and his colleagues appreciated that the Soviet armed forces could
no longer continue to compete with those fielded by the United States.
A closer parallel with the present confrontation between the West and the
Islamists was that between the Western countries and the Japanese in the 1930s
and 1940s. In that case too, a non-Western people were encouraged by their
leaders to become incensed by their victimization and humiliation at Western
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hands. They had been forced by the United States to open their ports to Western
trade and influence in the mid-nineteenth century; Western people had pushed
their way into Japan but insisted on not being subject to Japanese courts;
Japanese hopes of having a clause espousing racial equality in the League
Covenant had been rejected by the Western countries led by Australia; the
export of Japanese goods had been, to some extent, restricted in the 1930s by
Western tariffs despite the fact that Japan could not live from its own resources
because its expanding population depended upon trade to survive. All these
grievances coalesced with general resentment about discrimination against
Japan not to produce insurgency because the Japanese hoped to win in battle,
but a conventional war to the death between Western soldiers and Japanese."
The Emperor's troops did not surrender, they fought indomitably and died
where they stood in Burma, the Philippines, and Manchuria; and they tortured
or killed many of the Western soldiers, who surrendered, and Chinese,
Indonesians, and other Asian civilians whom they suspected of sympathizing
with the enemy. The Japanese completely rejected the League of Nations as a
Western construct designed to preserve the status quo to their disadvantage.
The present British Secretary of State for Defense, John Reid claimed in
a speech on February 20, 2006 that the West confronts "an unprecedented
enemy" today. We face, he said:
[A]n adversary which revels in mass murder; which sets out to cause
the greatest pain it can to innocent people; which is entirely
unconstrained by any law; which sees all civilians, including women
and children not as non-combatants but as easy targets; which sees
terror as a key part of its arsenal, and which both glorifies and
operates suicide bombers. It is an enemy, unfettered by any sense of
morality-indeed it is spurred on by a perverse perception ofmorality
12
to achieve ever-greater extent of civilian carnage.
In fact, every one of these characteristics applied to the Axis in the Second
World War and particularly to the Japanese, though also (apart from suicide
bombers) to Nazi Germany in its genocidal drive against the Jews, and East
European peoples whom it planned to exterminate or enslave.
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The Islamists and their supporters today, and the German and Japanese
Armies in the past, were fully aware of Western moral and judicial codes and
did not argue against them; rather they bypassed them. The Nazis never
admitted to murdering Jews and East Europeans, and the Japanese never
admitted to torturing and killing prisoners. In fact, the Japanese government
claimed to be operating in accord with international law. But, Tokyo in the
1930s and 1940s and the Islamists today have an interpretation of history,
which to their way of thinking overrides the dictates of morality. The Islamist
believes that the Umma has been persecuted for centuries by the West; that the
attack on the Turkish Empire in the First World War, the colonization of the
Middle East afterwards, the establishment of the state of Israel, and the recent
wars in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan are all the continuation of a premeditated
and historic Western "Crusade" against Islam. Furthermore, the Moslems
cannot fight back in a conventional fashion; their armies were defeated by
Israel, Britain, and France in 1956, by Israel in 1967 and 1973, and by the
United States, Britain, and their allies in 1991 and 2003. Therefore, they have
to fight as guerrillas or terrorists against Israel in particular and the West in
general; and this gives them the right to dismiss the principles of the Just War
and the rules of international law.
Just as the Japanese militarists in the 1930s had both wide-ranging complaints against Western behavior over the previous eighty years, and the
specific demand to set up a unipolar Asian international system centered on
Tokyo, without Western interference, so the Islamists have both specific and
general demands. Their general complaints are often against Western secularism and Christianity, hedonism and commercialism, and the spread of these
values to their own societies through the media, commerce, and travel-the
processes of globalization, which also first opened Japan to Western influence.
As the Saudi Imam, Dr Abd Al-Rahman Al-Sudayyis preached in July 2005:
The most dangerous weapon which the enemy has raised against uswith which he tore to pieces our order, and with which he soiled our
spiritual and social purity, is the terrible deluge of all manner of vice,
which is considered a form of moral terrorism against the values,
ideals, and virtues of the Islamic nation. [This war is waged] by
means of licentious satellite channels and the vile spider webs of the
Internet, whose gloom fills the sky with darkness and spreads its
stench in all directions. 3
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Such attacks are often accompanied by paranoia about Western institutions
and plans. The previous month, the Egyptian historian, Abd Al-Aziz claimed
on Saudi television that the Second Vatican Council had decided in 1965 to
impose Christianity on the whole world and that the World Council of Churches
had followed this up by delegating the mission to the United States in January
2001.14 In response, the administration had itself carried out the attacks on 9/11
and pinned responsibility upon Moslems.15 But, if Islamists argue that the West
is engaged in a general attack on Moslem values, Osama bin Laden and others
have had specific demands, including justice for the Palestinians and the
removal of US forces from Saudi Arabia, and now from other Islamic states
such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, concern about Western intervention
in Moslem states has resonance amongst other Moslems; fifty-three percent of
British Moslems said the July 2005 bombings on the London underground were
connected with the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq. 6
The war in Iraq was a major distraction for the United States administration from the covert struggle against al Qaeda. Worse still, the Iraq War
solidified the support amongst Moslems for the idea that the West was bent on
humiliating the Umma. Infractions of the law of war further increased the
general anger after publicity about the mistreatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib
and Camp Breadbasket, and British soldiers' beating of rioters in Basra. There
were even more serious examples of torture, and even killing. Thus, Iraqi
General Abed Hamed Mowhoush was savagely beaten by Chief Warrant
Officer Lewis Welshofer and a number of assistants, probably from the CIA.
Subsequently, he was asphyxiated in a sleeping bag. Welshofer and the defense
witnesses claimed at his trial that he had been encouraged to torture prisoners
by senior officers including General Robert Mixon. 7 Whether this is true or
not, such incidents expose the hypocrisy of Western claims to have outlawed
torture and create the climate of opinion in Moslem countries which has, for
example, led to the anti-US film, "Valley of the Wolves-Iraq" breaking box
office records in Turkish cinemas within days of its release.'" Given that
moderate Moslem opinion is the center of gravity in this struggle, this outcome
is equivalent to a major defeat in a conventional war.
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Anglo-American actions since 9/11 have thus been largely counterproductive to the struggle against al Qaeda. The most significant writer on
counter-insurgency to date is Sir Robert Thompson, who participated in the
successful British struggle against communist insurgents in Malaya during the
1950s. Thompson formulated a number of principles which any government
engaged in such a struggle should uphold. His first principle was that the
government should have a clear political aim. The United States and Britain
have confused their aims by invading Iraq and formulating Quixotic schemes
for "democratizing the Middle East." Thompson's second principle was that the
government should function in accordance with the law as "a government
which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a
government and cannot then expect its people to obey the law." Abu Ghraib,
Camp Breadbasket, the death of General Mowhoush, and others, the conditions
in Guantanamo speak for themselves. Thirdly, Thompson argued, the government must have an overall plan covering "all political, social, economic,
administrative, police and other measures which have a bearing on the
insurgency." Only thus would overlapping be avoided. Fourthly, "the government must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerrillas." In
other words, in this case, it is far more important to erode sympathy for al
Qaeda in the wider Moslem community than to hunt down Osama bin Laden;
and this is linked to Thompson's fifth point that a government must secure its
base area, in this case, the United States homeland before worrying about
operations overseas. Thompson was writing about insurgency in the Third
World but it is clear that the British and American governments have failed to
heed his advice about how to wage a war against unconventional forces of any
type. The penalties will be severe.' 9
The West has not effectively undermined the historical argument which
underlies the Islamist case. It has failed to point out that it has often protected
Moslems and Moslem societies. Britain spent most of the nineteenth century
trying to protect the Turkish Empire, it was only when London discovered its
isolation during the Boer war and its inability to protect Constantinople, that
British policy changed.2 ° This left Turkey free to join the German side in the
First World War. If Western countries took over much of the Middle East after
the First World War, they had to find some way of ruling this region following
the collapse of the Turkish Empire. Nor did Britain plan the emergence of a
Jewish state, what it promised was a Jewish "homeland" within Palestine. In
1991, the United States, Britain, and France fought to expel Iraq from the
Moslem state of Kuwait; the United States forced the Serbs to compromise with
19.
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the Moslem Bosniaks at Dayton in November 1995; and NATO expelled the
Serb army from the predominantly Moslem province of Kosovo by attacking
Serbia itself from March to June 1999. Until about this point the West was
religion-blind. It is only gradually that attitudes have changed, but, even now,
Westerners do not usually express hostility towards Moslems. Immediately
after the Islamist bombings on the London Underground in July 2005, fifty-five
percent of Americans expressed a favorable view of American Moslems and a
majority denied that Islam encouraged violence. 21 Sixty percent dismissed the
claim that there was a clash of civilizations as opposed to a clash with a small
Islamist group. 22
All this is particularly important because the struggle against al-Qaeda can
only be won if Moslem groups in the West do not feel alienated and isolated.
There is a consensus that good intelligence is the key to defeating terrorist
groups. Such intelligence can come from electronic intercepts, from the wider
Moslem community, or from terrorists who have been won over. Politicians
often claim to want terrorists destroyed, but dead terrorists take their secrets to
the grave, one who has been "turned" is invaluable to the government. This is
unlikely to happen when captured terrorists are congregated together and
physically mistreated. Weak, former drifters are much more likely to be
affected by probing into their past, trying to make them feel there are others
who sympathize with their former loneliness beyond the Islamist group, playing
on their psychological weaknesses. Tough-minded terrorist leaders need to be
challenged on their own theological ground by Moslems, who dispute the
historical and theological justifications they have been using to defend random
violence in the same way that communist interrogators turned the old
Bolsheviks' faith in communism against themselves during the Moscow show
trials in the 1930s. 3
Attempts to bend captured terrorists to the will of Western governments
must be attuned to their psychology. Jerrold Post, Professor of Psychiatry at
George Washington University discerned, in terrorists in general, a
[T]endency to externalize, to seek outside sources to blame for
personal inadequacies. Other prominent traits were a defensive
grandiosity, an exaggerated self-absorption with little regard for the
feelings of others . . . they had split off the devalued parts of
themselves and projected them on to the establishment which then
became the target of their violent aggression ... troubled family
21.
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backgrounds [mean] many terrorists have an incomplete psychosocial
identity and an exaggerated need to belong. 4
Post said the West German police had found that twenty-five percent of
terrorists had lost one or both parents by age fourteen and a third had convictions before juvenile courts.2 5 Many had failed in their jobs or schools; they
were isolated failures who made the terrorist group the family they had never
enjoyed.
This aptly describes many of the individuals who have become prominent
amongst Islamist terrorists and particularly those living in the West; Osama bin
Laden himself had a marginalized childhood in his wealthy family because of
his mother's nationality and position as a concubine;26 Asif Iqbal and Ruhal
Ahmed, two of those Britons held by United States forces had been convicted
earlier of attacking someone with a hammer; Moazzam Begg, another of the
Guantanamo Britons had been educated in a Jewish school in the British
Midlands, lost his mother when he was young and dropped out of university
before joining a radical Moslem group;27 Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber" led
the life of a drifter and petty criminal in south London before being converted
to Islam in Brixton jail; Abu Hamza, who preached murder for years at the
Finsbury Mosque and is accused of helping to kidnap Westerners in Aden, was
a nightclub bouncer, and as so often with Moslem extremists, a womanizer
before he became an Islamist and went to Afghanistan where he lost his hands
and one eye;2" Omar Khayam, who pretended to be a suicide bomber at the
protests in London in February 2006 against the publication of cartoons about
Mohammed, was a convicted drug dealer on probation.2 9 And so the litany
continues.
But how do Western governments bend the will of those who have failed
within their societies and want to kill or maim as many Western people as
possible? Post argued that where possible, benign neglect was the best policy
because; if a powerful Western government focused attention on the terrorists,
it would inflate their prestige and encourage others toj oin the cause. Deterrence
would not work because terrorists were not afraid of death and threats would
confirm their paranoia and their belief that they were righteous warriors
24.
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engaged in a full-scale war against a hostile state. He believed that governments
should concentrate on trying to dissuade new recruits fromj oining the terrorists
not least by an extensive information policy, and that takes us back to the
historical arguments outlined above.
In the case of the Islamists, benign neglect has failed; Abu Hamza and
others like him were able for years to promote and plan murder. Discouraging
recruits from joining the terrorists is crucial but there will always be some who
fail and some Moslems who feel disorientated in the West. On the other hand,
governments have made little effort to use this in the propaganda battle. There
has been an utter failure to point out that the terrorists are united by their guilt
about their youthful activities-bin Laden's period in the Beirut discotheques
is archetypal. What the Islamists are doing is expiating their own feelings of
guilt by threatening or killing Western people. Nor have Western governments
pointed out that they are dealing with an abject bunch of social failures, petty
drug smugglers, violent semi-deranged individuals who are no advertisement
for the Moslem cause. Attacking them, as John Reid did, for not abiding by the
values accepted by most of the international community is a waste of time
because emotionally, they need to belong to the Islamist family, while on the
rational level they argue that their history and situation gives them the right to
override or reject these values.
The conclusion is obvious. The West's primary defenses are the police and
the intelligence services which have the task of tracking down terrorists before
they can attack and persuading them to divulge their secrets. The West's
offensive capacity is not primarily made up of its armed forces, which are a
weapon of last resort, but its "soft power," its ability to win over the mass of
Moslem people. The West has become flabby during the years when the BBC,
CNN, Hollywood, Reuters, and Associated Press dominated the media. That
age has gone with the development of the internet and satellite television
stations in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Saudi Imam quoted above shows
that these developments have caused concern in the Moslem world as well as
the West and many of the problems they cause are, indeed, common to all states
and peoples. But Western governments need to make at least as much effort as
they did during the Cold War to develop a coherent media policy. Every action
they take must be judged by its impact around the world and particularly, on the
Umma. The funds wasted on building up Western conventional forces and
invading Iraq would have been incomparably more effective if they had been
directed to winning hearts and minds. This is the "great struggle" ahead which
will last throughout our lifetime and which we need to address with the same
sort of intellectual focus and determination which was employed on the analysis
of nuclear deterrence and arms control during the Cold War years.

